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INTRODUCTION
Today, many institutional arrangements reached in the midtwentieth century are being rethought and renegotiated. One such
arrangement involves libel, and the responsibility of publishers for
harm they cause via defamation. In his recent concurrence to the
denial of certiorari in the case of McKee v. Cosby,1 Justice Clarence
Thomas called for the Supreme Court to revisit the constitutional
protections for publishers of libelous material, arguing that the
existing arrangement, dating to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan2 and
its progeny, is out of date and unsupported by the Constitution.3 As
even some left-leaning scholars note, he may have a point, and it
seems likely that the Supreme Court will revisit the issue of libel in
the near future.4
In this short Essay, I will discuss Thomas’s critique, the broader
problem of fairly adjudicating libel cases in an era of widespread
publishing and social media, and the impact of the Sullivan regime
over the past half-century. I will then suggest some remedies to the
problems identified—remedies that fall short of overturning Sullivan,
but that would still represent a significant change in current law—
and I will explain why the Supreme Court is more likely to follow such
an approach than to overturn Sullivan outright.

* Beauchamp Brogan Distinguished Professor of Law, University of
Tennessee. J.D. Yale Law School, B.A. The University of Tennessee. Thanks to
Charles Glasser for some excellent comments, and to Hannah Haley DeMaio for firstrate research assistance.
1. 139 S. Ct. 675 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. McKee, 139 S. Ct. at 676–78.
4. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
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I. BACKGROUND: THE SULLIVAN PRINCIPLES
Under the common law of libel, which was applied throughout the
United States with minor variations prior to the Sullivan decision,
publishers were liable for damages for publishing material that was
false and defamatory (i.e., tending to injure the subject by lowering
him or her in the opinion of society or of peers).5 This was true across
the range of speakers and of subjects, whether it was newspapers
writing about the president or publications regarding private
citizens.6 Public figures did not have to satisfy any sort of heightened
standard for liability, malice was presumed unless some common law
privilege or right applied, and both general and special damages were
recoverable, plus punitive damages upon a showing of malice.7 Truth
was a defense, but if the publication was false, a plaintiff was entitled
to at least nominal damages even if he or she could show no actual
injury.8 At common law, false and defamatory stories about public
figures were seen as actually more damaging, because of their targets’
roles in the community, than libels of private figures.9
Protection of reputations was seen as very important. In an era
before credit scores and online background checks, reputational
capital was an essential part of social and financial relations,
especially among the elite.10 People were thus willing to go to great
lengths to preserve reputations, as the prevalence of the custom of
dueling around the time of the framing of the U.S. Constitution

5.
6.
7.

McKee, 139 S. Ct. at 678.
See id. at 679.
Id. at 678 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *150 (1765) and
HENRY COLEMAN FOLKARD, STARKIE ON SLANDER AND LIBEL (H. Wood ed., 4th ed.
1877)). But see Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281, 285–86 (Kan. 1908) (cited by the
Sullivan Court as an instructive example already articulating the rule it ultimately
adopted).
8. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 372 (1974) (White, J.,
dissenting).
9. See McKee, 139 S. Ct. at 679 (“Words also tending to scandalize a magistrate,
or person in a public trust, are reputed more highly injurious than when spoken of a
private man.” (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *124)).
10. See, e.g., Lindsay Konsko, The Origin of the Credit Score, NERDWALLET (Aug.
12,
2014),
https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/finance/origin-credit-score-history/
(detailing the history of the credit score and noting that before the system was created,
reputational capital was generally built by asking others to vouch for one’s character);
Sean Trainor, The Long, Twisted History of Your Credit Score, TIME (July 22, 2015,
7:00 AM), https://time.com/3961676/history-credit-scores/ (same).
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illustrates11—one who was insulted but did not issue a challenge, or
who refused a challenge, was likely to face ostracism, resulting in
social and financial disaster at the very least. In fact, one bit of fallout
from the famed Hamilton/Burr duel was an effort, initially
unsuccessful, to persuade the defamed to seek their remedies in court
via libel actions, rather than on the field of honor.12
By the twentieth century, for better or worse, the libel action had
taken the place of pistols at dawn as a way of seeking redress for
reputational harm, and the common law of libel managed to coexist
with a free press quite handily, and with little perceived conflict. That
all changed with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, when the Supreme
Court decided to subject libel law to an unprecedented degree of First
Amendment control.13 The Court had its reasons for doing so, and they
were not bad ones, but the state of current libel law suggests that the
changes that have been made far outstrip the justifications for the
Sullivan ruling.14
The Sullivan lawsuit was an action brought by a government
official against an out-of-town newspaper, to be tried in a local court
before a sympathetic local jury.15 This was not an isolated event.
Unhappy with northern news organizations’ coverage of segregation
and civil rights marches, southern officials had formulated a plan of
asymmetric warfare: while civil rights marchers had the sympathy of
powerful national media organizations, those organizations were
subject to the jurisdiction of local courts and juries in the south, courts
and juries that could be expected to be unsympathetic toward hostile
out-of-state media.16 Sullivan’s was just one of many such lawsuits
filed against national news outlets, and the strategy was, until the
Sullivan decision, a highly successful one.

11. See generally Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Hamilton, Hip-Hop, and the Culture
of Dueling in America, in THE LAW OF HAMILTON: AN AMERICAN MUSICAL (Lisa
Tucker ed., forthcoming 2020) (discussing the culture of dueling).
12. Id.; see also Benjamin J. Barton, Hamilton, Burr, and Defamation, in THE
LAW OF HAMILTON: AN AMERICAN MUSICAL (Lisa Tucker ed., forthcoming 2020).
13. See McKee, 139 S. Ct. at 677.
14. See Roy S. Gutterman, Actually . . . A Renewed Stand for the First
Amendment Actual Malice Defense, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 579, 592–93 (2018).
15. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).
16. See David A. Anderson, Wechsler’s Triumph, 66 ALA. L. REV. 229, 237, 247–
49 (2014); James Maxwell Koffler, The Pre-Sullivan Common Law Web of Protection
Against Political Defamation Suits, 47 HOFSTRA L. REV. 153, 156 (2018); Howard M.
Wasserman, A Jurisdictional Perspective on New York Times v. Sullivan, 107 NW. U.
L. REV. 901, 904 (2013).
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The Court recognized this reality. Justice Hugo Black called these
libel suits a “technique for harassing and punishing a free press” in
his Sullivan concurrence.17 He explained:
There is no reason to believe that there are not more
such [suits] lurking just around the corner for the
Times or any other newspaper which might dare to
criticize public officials. In fact, briefs before us show
that in Alabama there are now pending eleven libel
suits by local and state officials against the Times
seeking $5,600,000, and five such suits against the
Columbia Broadcasting System seeking $1,700,000.
Moreover, this technique for harassing and punishing
a free press . . . can be used in other fields where public
feelings may make local as well as out-of-state
newspapers easy prey for libel verdict seekers.18
By 1964, when the Sullivan case came before the Court,
“government officials had filed at least $300 million in libel actions
against newspapers, news magazines, television networks, and civil
rights leaders.”19
These lawsuits were intended to chill or banish negative coverage.
As Anthony Lewis wrote, the libel campaign was a “state political
weapon to intimidate the press. The aim was to discourage not false
but true accounts of life under a system of white supremacy . . . . It
was to scare the national press—newspapers, magazines, the
television networks—off the civil rights story.”20 A private
communication between Birmingham Commissioner J.T. Waggoner,
a plaintiff in another libel suit, and his attorney James A. Simpson
“casts some doubt on whether Waggoner felt defamed personally.
Simpson told Waggoner the suit would help deter newspapers such as
the Times from committing ‘ruthless attacks on this region and its
people. I am sure this is the primary motive which has prompted you
to embark on this troublesome litigation.’”21

17. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 295 (Black, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 294–95.
19. AIMEE EDMONDSON, IN SULLIVAN’S SHADOW: THE USE AND ABUSE OF LIBEL
LAW DURING THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE 101 (2019).
20. ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 35 (1991).
21. EDMONSON, supra note 19, at 976 (citation omitted).
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And, until the Sullivan opinion was handed down, this approach
worked. As Harrison Salisbury wrote, news media outlets had to
“think twice about reporting the facts, harsh and raw as they often
were.”22 And the Montgomery Advertiser called the libel suits a
“formidable club to swing at out-of-state press,” and observed that
“[t]he recent checkmating of the Times in Alabama will impose a
restraint on other publications.”23 Lawyers for the Times went as far
as encouraging reporters to avoid Alabama, to avoid generating more
libel suits or risking being served with a subpoena.24 Stories were even
killed for fear of these suits:
On the advice of their lawyers, Times editors killed a
Sunday story Sitton wrote in late 1962 about a change
in the Birmingham city government that might
“depose Commissioner Eugene (Bull) Connor, whom
negroes regard as one of the South’s toughest police
bosses.” Times lawyer Tom Daly advised editors that
the story “might indicate malice” in the pending
Sullivan suit before the Supreme Court. It did indeed
appear that “public officials had achieved their
objective, [and] Jim Crow could return to its good old
days, operating with virtually no scrutiny.”25
Against this background of a concerted effort to encumber or
impair First Amendment rights through strategic litigation—aimed
at affecting the behavior of the news industry as a whole, rather than
compensating a discrete injury—the Supreme Court created what
Andrew McClurg denotes as a “right to be negligent,”26 by limiting
libel claims against public officials and public figures to cases where
the plaintiff could show “actual malice.”27 The Court concluded that
otherwise, the tort system might be used by powerful interests to
undermine the First Amendment, an important part of the Bill of
Rights.28

22.

HARRISON E. SALISBURY, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR: THE NEW YORK TIMES
384 (1980).
23. EDMONDSON, supra note 19, at 98 (quoting Grover Hall, Checkmate,
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, May 22, 1960, at 15).
24. Id.
25. Id. (citations omitted).
26. Andrew J. McClurg, The Second Amendment Right to Be Negligent, 68 FLA.
L. REV. 1, 1 (2016).
27. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280, 283 (1964).
28. Id. at 285, 292.
AND ITS TIMES

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3668517

470

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87.465

In drafting the Sullivan opinion, the Court was very conscious of
the local officials’ use (abuse?) of what lawyers call “home cooking” to
disadvantage out-of-state media defendants. The solution was to
substantially rewrite the law of libel. As Anthony Lewis writes,
Commissioner Sullivan’s real target was the role of the
American press as an agent of democratic change. He
and other Southern officials who had sued the Times
for libel were trying to choke off a process that was
educating the country about the nature of racism and
was affecting political attitudes on that issue. Thus in
the broadest sense the libel suits were a challenge to
the principles of the First Amendment. But making a
legal argument to that effect faced an enormous
obstacle. Libelous utterances had always been
regarded as outside the First Amendment, an
exception to the “freedom of speech” it guarantees. The
Supreme Court had repeatedly said that libelous
publications were not protected. . . . Libel, the Court
said, was not “within the area of constitutionally
protected speech.”29
Turning this around was not easy for Justice William J. Brennan,
writes Lewis, who reviewed the multiple draft opinions and notes of
the justices’ clerks:
Justice Brennan had great difficulty marshaling a
majority and holding it. He wrote eight different drafts
of the opinion. Until the last moment there was a real
possibility, even a probability, that it would not
command a majority. Not until the evening of March
8, the night before Justice Brennan announced the
decision, did Justice Harlan agree to join him without
reservations.30
The eventual formula which, according to Lewis, Harlan joined as
much out of a desire to maintain the Court’s institutional authority as
because he was intellectually persuaded,31 is the one we have all come
to know: to recover for libel, a public official must show actual malice,

29.
30.
31.

LEWIS, supra note 20, at 42–43.
Id. at 164.
See id.
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that is, publication of information that the publisher knows to be false,
or which they published with reckless disregard as to its truth or
falsity.32
One may suggest—as Justice Thomas’s recent remarks did—that
this departure from prior law was motivated more by political
concerns than by constitutional doctrine or history.33 As written, the
Sullivan decision was a comparatively narrow response to an entirely
novel litigation campaign. But subsequent decisions suggested that
the Court was more concerned with protecting the institutional press
in general than with merely reining in the excesses of a cabal of
segregationist politicians.34
The first evidence of this concern involves the replacement of the
comparatively narrow and limited “public official” category with the
much larger and less well-defined category of “public figure.” And in
very short order, the Court left the “public official” limitation behind.
In Time, Inc. v. Hill,35 the plaintiffs were a family that had been
held hostage by escaped convicts.36 A television dramatization of their
experience suggested, falsely, that the father had been beaten and the
daughter threatened with “a verbal sexual insult.”37 The original draft
of Justice Abe Fortas’s majority opinion contained very strong
language about the damage done by such false characterizations, but
Justice Hugo Black responded that large libel judgments (though this
one was only $30,000) would make the press too cautious in general.38
Fortas lost his majority, and the opinion wound up being authored by
Justice Brennan, who made clear that protecting the institutional
press was the top priority.39 As to having false and defamatory things
written or broadcast about us? Brennan essentially argued that we
assume the risk by participating in society.

32. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280.
33. See McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice
Hugo Black also seems to have felt this way—but to have approved of the departure—
in a note written to Justice Brennan in which he observed: “Most inventions even of
legal principles come out of urgent needs. The need to protect speech in this area is so
great that it will be recognized and acted upon sooner or later. The rationalization for
it is not important; the result is what counts . . . .” LEWIS, supra note 20, at 175.
34. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
35. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
36. Id. at 377–78.
37. Id. at 378.
38. LEWIS, supra note 20, at 185–86.
39. Hill, 385 U.S. at 388.
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The guarantees for speech and press are not the
preserve of political expression or comment upon
public affairs, essential as those are to healthy
government. One need only pick up any newspaper or
magazine to comprehend the vast range of published
matter which exposes persons to public view, both
private citizens and public officials. Exposure of the
self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life
in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is
an essential incident of life in a society which places a
primary value on freedom of speech and of press.40
The issue is no longer public officials’ collusion against a free
press; instead, it is the supremacy of press freedom over other issues,
such as privacy. The traditional role of libel law, in fact, was precisely
to demonstrate that in a civilized society there are limits to the
“exposure of the self.”41
Justice Harlan made these very points in his opinion, noting that
public officials have thick skins and access to the press, something
that ordinary citizens like the Hills did not.42 But he did not carry the
day. In keeping with Justice Brennan’s emphasis on protecting the
press, the Court in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts43 drastically
expanded the Sullivan rule to protect the press not merely from
lawsuits for defamatory statements regarding public officials,
government authorities wielding the power of the state, but also from
lawsuits filed by a new category of plaintiff, the “public figure.”44
What is a public figure? As the newspaper attorney in the motion
picture Absence of Malice observes, “If I knew that I should be a judge.
They never tell us until it’s too late,” adding, “I must admit I’d be more
comfortable if he were a movie star or a football coach—football
coaches are very safe.”45 Well, yes. It also seems to be about thrusting.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,46 the scope and effect of public figure
status was expanded.47 Writing for the Court, Justice Lewis Powell
quoted Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v.
40. Id. at 388–89.
41. Id. at 405–11 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
42. Id. at 408–10.
43. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
44. Id. at 155.
45. ABSENCE OF MALICE (Columbia Pictures 1981), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=2SGe-IywHXg.
46. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
47. Id. at 342–45.
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Metromedia, Inc.:48 “If a matter is a subject of public or general
interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private
individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did not
‘voluntarily’ choose to become involved.”49 As Donald Magnetti
comments, “In Rosenbloom, the seed of New York Times had grown
into a veritable protective thicket surrounding the media. Although
the phrase ‘matter of public interest’ was left undefined, what purpose
is there for the media to publish something that is of no interest to the
public?”50
The Court found, however, that private figures retained a right to
actual damages without showing “actual malice,” and to punitive
damages if such a showing of actual malice could be made.51 Mr.
Gertz, the Court found, was a private figure, as he “did not thrust
himself into the vortex of this public issue, nor did he engage the
public’s attention in an attempt to influence its outcome.”52
Sullivan was a response to government officials’ use of friendly
local courts to harm out-of-state publishers, in the name of promoting
free speech. Gertz, however, essentially approved a sort of “tax” on free
speech—if you “thrust” yourself into a public debate (a phrasing that
suggests that there is something vaguely inappropriate about your
involvement somehow), then you pay a price: People may now libel
you with much less fear of consequences. Rather than protection for
free speech, the Gertz formulation looks more like an admonition to
the peasantry to know its place. The “thrust” language from Gertz was
echoed in Time, Inc. v. Firestone,53 where Justice William Rehnquist
held that people do not count as public figures unless they have
“thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies
in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.”54 Nice
reputation you’ve got there. Shame if something were to happen to it.
“Public official” is tolerably clear. There may be minor government
employees whose status as “officials” might be questioned, but in
general it should be easy for speakers to know when they are
criticizing a public official versus a citizen. The “public figure”
question is much less clear—particularly in today’s era of social

48. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
49. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 337 (quoting Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 43).
50. Donald L. Magnetti, ‘In The End, Truth Will Out’ . . . Or Will It?, 52 MO. L.
REV. 299, 314 (1987).
51. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
52. Id. at 352.
53. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
54. Id. at 453 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345).
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media, when sudden and often unsought fame via viral videos or
tweets is common—but the Court’s treatment seems more like an
admonition to keep your head down.
Sullivan’s legacy was not improved by the Court’s opinion in St.
Amant v. Thompson,55 where the Court declined to apply a
reasonable-person test to publication: Actual malice, it held, can be
found only where the publisher entertained serious doubts that the
publication was true.56 A failure to investigate, absent those
subjective doubts, could not be evidence of actual malice.57
The upshot is that most likely libel plaintiffs will be public figures
who must show actual malice, and in order to show actual malice they
must be able to demonstrate that the publisher entertained actual
serious doubts, something which, as a matter of proof, will often turn
out to be difficult. And even private figures must show actual malice
to collect punitive damages.58 When a University of Virginia Dean
sued Rolling Stone over a fraudulent report of a gang rape at a party,
she was able to demonstrate actual subjective doubts because an
independent investigation by the Columbia Journalism Review,
which the Rolling Stone’s lawyers must surely have regretted, made
such doubts plain.59 Few future plaintiffs will be so lucky.
Proving actual malice is made even more difficult by two
procedural decisions from the Supreme Court, Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly60 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.61 These cases (sometimes combined
as Twiqbal by commenters) set a high pleading standard for cases
involving actual malice. The Sullivan/Gertz line of cases require
actual malice to be proved by clear and convincing evidence;62 the
Twiqbal cases require that facts showing malice be shown at the
pleading stage, prior to discovery.63
As Judy Cornett writes:
According to the Twombly Court, the district court
was not required to draw the inference of illegal
agreement. Rather, it was up to the plaintiffs to plead

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

390 U.S. 727 (1968).
Id. at 731.
Id. at 733 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287–88 (1964)).
See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
Eramo v. Rolling Stone, LLC, 209 F. Supp. 3d 862, 871–72 (W.D. Va. 2016).
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342; Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285–86.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686–87; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
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facts that would “nudge[] their claims across the line
from conceivable to plausible.”
....
In Iqbal the Court held that the new plausibility
pleading standard applies to all cases. The Court also
clarified how lower courts should go about applying
the new standard. First, the court must identify
allegations that “are no more than conclusions.”
Second, setting aside these conclusions, the court
should
peruse
the
“well-pleaded
factual
allegations, . . . assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.”64
This makes pleading actual malice very difficult for libel plaintiffs,
since it requires proof of a subjective doubt about the truthfulness of
the publication. In the absence of an objective standard based on, say
what a “reasonably prudent person” would or would not have
published, plaintiffs must prove state of mind—and under Twiqbal
must make their case before discovery can produce things like emails
or internal memos that might be evidence of such doubts.
As Professor Cornett notes, prior to Twiqbal it was enough to
plead that the defendant “knew” the statement was false, or “acted
with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity” or “entertained
serious doubts.”65 But now that is not enough:
Now, however the publisher’s state of mind must be
plausibly pleaded in order to avoid dismissal. Under
the Twiqbal regime, it is no longer enough to plead
that the defendant made the allegedly libelous
statements with knowledge of their falsity or with
reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity. Such
general statements are now branded as conclusions.
Instead, facts must be pleaded to “nudge” the claim
“across the line from conceivable to plausible.”66

64. Judy M. Cornett, Pleading Actual Malice in Defamation Actions After
Twiqbal: A Circuit Survey, 17 NEV. L.J. 709, 713–14 (2017) (internal citations omitted)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
65. Id. at 715.
66. Id. at 715–16 (citations omitted).
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It is difficult to overstate the difficulty this standard poses: “So far, no
libel complaint filed by a public figure that has reached a Circuit
Court of Appeals has succeeded in plausibly pleading actual malice.”67
It is, as noted, not impossible to prove actual malice on the part of
a publisher—it is merely extremely difficult and requires unusual
facts. Nicole Eramo, a University of Virginia Dean vilified in a
fraudulent story about campus rape published in Rolling Stone,
secured a jury verdict for $3 million.68 But she was able to do so
essentially because the Columbia Journalism Review, which Rolling
stone had brought in to do a post-mortem review, had in essence done
the discovery for her, producing numerous emails and interviews that
showed the editors’ dubious mental state and decision to go ahead and
publish anyway.69
It is unlikely that this sort of inquiry will often be repeated,
especially given how it worked out for Rolling Stone. And in the
absence of some sort of record of doubt that can be obtained outside of
the discovery process, the Twombly/Iqbal doctrine stands as an almost
insuperable barrier to libel plaintiffs pleading malice:
Because discovery is not available under Twiqbal
until the 12(b)(6) hurdle is surmounted, the use of the
plausibility standard in public-figure libel actions
works a grave injustice to plaintiffs. Faced with a
substantive standard [actual malice] that, for good
reason, is higher than normal, they are also faced with
a pleading standard that is insurmountable, for
reasons that are unclear at best.

67. Id. at 716. Note, however, that after Cornett’s piece was published, former
Governor and presidential candidate Sarah Palin did succeed in showing plausibility
before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, after a district judge had found
otherwise. See Palin v. N.Y. Times Co., 940 F.3d 804, 817 (2d Cir. 2019). The
circumstances again were somewhat unusual, including a defendant editor who had
previously edited—and thus had actual knowledge of—articles demonstrating that the
central claim of the New York Times editorial regarding Palin was false. Id. at 808–
09.
68. See Doreen McCallister, ‘Rolling Stone’ Settles Defamation Case with
Former U.Va. Associate Dean, NPR (Apr. 12, 2017, 4:32 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/04/12/523527227/rolling-stone-settlesdefamation-case-with-former-u-va-associate-dean. See generally Eramo v. Rolling
Stone, LLC, 209 F. Supp. 3d 862 (W.D. Va. 2016).
69. See Cornett, supra note 64, at 723–27; see also Eramo, 209 F. Supp. 3d at
871–72.
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. . . [T]he plausibility standard bars plaintiffs from
discovery whether or not discovery in the particular
case might prove to be overly burdensome or expensive
for the defendant. And in cases where the defendant’s
state of mind must ultimately be proven by the
plaintiff—like public figure libel cases—the bar to
discovery puts plaintiffs in a catch-22 situation. The
plaintiff must allege facts from which knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard of truth or falsity must be
inferred, but the plaintiff has no access to the tools of
discovery with which to learn these essential facts.70
We are thus in a situation where public figures—or private figures
who want to collect more than actual damages—face nearly
insuperable hurdles stemming from a variety of doctrinal changes.
Although New York Times Co. v. Sullivan gets the blame, it is only
part, and perhaps not the largest part, of the problem. Which brings
us back to Justice Thomas’s suggestion that New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan should be scrapped.
II. A POST-SULLIVAN WORLD?
Even Cass Sunstein, a Harvard professor and Obama-era
appointee, not generally on the same page as Thomas, agrees that the
constitutional foundations of the Sullivan case are weak.71 Noting
that the case in question, McKee v. Cosby, involved a libel suit against
Cosby by his rape accuser, Kathrine McKee, Sunstein observes:
Because McKee was involved in a public
controversy, she counted as a public figure. Under
New York Times v. Sullivan, decided in 1964, she
could not win unless she could demonstrate that
Cosby’s lawyer had “actual malice,” which means that
he knew he was lying, or that he acted “with reckless
indifference” to the question of truth or falsity.
It’s really hard to demonstrate that, so McKee’s
lawsuit was bound to be dismissed.

70. Cornett, supra note 64, at 727–28 (citations omitted).
71. See Cass R. Sunstein, Clarence Thomas Has a Point About Free-Speech
Law, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 21, 2019, 11:38 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/
articles/2019-02-21/clarence-thomas-has-a-point-about-free-speech.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3668517

478

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87.465

Thomas is an “originalist”; he believes that
interpretation of the Constitution should be settled by
reference to the “original public meaning” of its terms.
Thomas offers considerable evidence that at the time
of ratification, those who wrote and ratified the Bill of
Rights were comfortable with libel actions—and that
they did not mean to impose anything like the “actual
malice” standard.
A defamed individual (including a public figure)
needed only to prove that a written publication was
false and that it subjected him to hatred, contempt or
ridicule. And for 170 years, the Supreme Court never
held that the First Amendment forbids the states from
protecting people from libel.
Thomas concludes that New York Times v.
Sullivan, and the many subsequent decisions
implementing it, were “policy-driven decisions
masquerading as constitutional law.”72
Sunstein adds: “There are strong objections to originalism, of
course. But whatever your theory of constitutional interpretation, it
is hardly obvious that the First Amendment forbids rape victims from
seeking some kind of redress from people who defame them.”73 But
that is in fact the logic of existing caselaw: By accusing someone—
especially someone famous—of rape, one automatically becomes a
public figure, and by becoming a public figure, one becomes virtually
ineligible for protection against defamation. Worse yet, thanks to
Google, such defamation becomes near-permanent. Where once a
defamatory headline on a Tuesday was wrapped around fish by
Thursday, now it remains, evergreen, to be recalled whenever the
defamed’s name is searched.
One solution, as advocated by Justice Thomas, would be to simply
overturn New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.74 As both Thomas and
Sunstein point out, the structure of public versus private figures, the
actual malice test, etc., are not readily derivable from the First and

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See generally McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 676 (2019) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (arguing that Sullivan was “policy-driven” and should be reconsidered).
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Fourteenth Amendments.75 Indeed, it is easy to read Sullivan and its
progeny, and the history of the case as recounted by Anthony Lewis,
as evidence that the Court was moved more by a class-solidarity with
members of the chattering classes than by constitutional doctrine.76
Overturning Sullivan would effectively return us to the pre-1964
era of libel law, in which public officials and private figures were
treated alike and “actual malice” was not required. This prospect
produced considerable agitation in some quarters when Thomas wrote
his concurrence: Thomas was accused of wanting to “crush the free
press,”77 or of impeding the “public’s right to know,”78 or even of
declaring war on “the very idea of a free press.”79 But these criticisms
are basically nonsense. To argue that overturning the Sullivan
opinion would end the free press in America is to argue that the press
in America, prior to the Sullivan opinion, was unfree, which seems
rather extreme. The Sullivan opinion was a response to a particular
set of facts, which had not obtained in the past and which are unlikely
to obtain in the future. Indeed, from the harshest of legal-realist
standpoints one could justify overturning Sullivan today on that basis
alone. To quote Justice Black: “The rationalization for it is not
important; the result is what counts . . . .”80
One doubts, however, that there are five members of the Court
who partake of such an unwatered form of legal realism (and even
Justice Black required some window-dressing for his desired result).
But if overturning Sullivan is not the solution to our present doctrinal
tangle, is there something less drastic that might achieve greater
justice?

75. See Id. at 678–80; see also Sunstein, supra note 71.
76. See GLENN HARLAN REYNOLDS, THE JUDICIARY’S CLASS WAR 31–33 (2018)
(discussing the Warren Court’s First Amendment doctrine in light of class conflict, as
effectively a subsidy to the institutional press and a weakening of juries—the only noncredentialed part of the judicial process).
77. Will Bunch, Clarence Thomas Wants to Crush the Free Press Just Like
Southern Segregationists of the 1960s, PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 21, 2019, 2:00 PM),
https://www.inquirer.com/opinion/commentary/clarence-thomas-libel-law-sullivannew-york-times-free-press-alabama-segregation-20190221.html.
78. See John Diaz, Clarence Thomas vs. Public’s Right to Know, S.F. CHRON.
(Feb. 23, 2019, 9:20 AM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/diaz/article/ClarenceThomas-vs-public-s-right-to-know-13638284.php.
79. Ian Milhiser, Clarence Thomas Declares War on the Very Idea of a Free
Press, THINKPROGRESS (Feb. 19, 2019, 1:18 PM),
https://archive.thinkprogress.org/clarence-thomas-declares-war-on-free-press9bb7391925e7/.
80. LEWIS, supra note 20, at 175.
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Professor Sunstein suggests “new and creative thinking,” allowing
those who are defamed to require retractions, or to receive
“appropriate (and appropriately limited) monetary compensation.”81
Such remedies could be imposed by the Court of course—as Justice
Brennan himself famously said, “with five votes, ‘you can do anything
around here,’”82—but the Court has consistently struck down
legislative efforts in the way of required retractions or reply, and in
our world, “appropriately limited” monetary compensation is
normally simply the monetary compensation that a jury finds
appropriate.83
Instead of overturning the famous linchpin of current doctrine,
though, a more cautious Court (and they are all more cautious than
Justice Thomas!) might well choose to target some of its descendants.
And there are a number of promising targets.
One possibility would involve simply eliminating the “public
figure” concept and returning to the “public official” language of the
Sullivan opinion. This approach would undo most of the harm to
plaintiffs, while retaining the rationale for the original decision,
which was inspired by a cabal of state officials trying to avoid media
scrutiny.
Likewise, overturning or tightening St. Amant, or applying a
“reasonable person” standard for investigating potentially defamatory
claims before publication would substantially change the balance of
power, and in a way that would be unlikely to raise a fuss. The
“reasonable person” standard is widely deployed in tort law and
should be readily understood by courts and juries. To the extent that
standard good practices of journalism help to demonstrate
reasonableness, such a change would encourage news organizations
to adopt—and adhere to—those sorts of practices, something that
would redound to the benefit of both journalists and those whom they
cover.
Even an opinion to the effect that the Twombly/Iqbal doctrine does
not apply in libel cases would, at this point, work considerable change,
and in a way that only media lawyers would be likely even to notice.
As noted above, requiring plaintiffs to prove actual subjective malice
by a clear and convincing evidence standard is a very high burden
already. Requiring them to also demonstrate plausible factual support

81. Sunstein, supra note 71.
82. Adam D. Chandler, How (Not) to Bring an Affirmative-Action Challenge, 122
YALE L.J. F. 85, 106 (2012) (citing H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL DECISION 16 (2008)).
83. See Sunstein, supra note 71.
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at the pleading stage, before any discovery, is to make that burden
almost insuperable.84 Rather than return libel law to its pre-1964
stage, such a ruling would merely return things to their state a decade
or so ago.
CONCLUSION
My own prediction is that the Court will take this more cautious
approach, and there is precedent. During the oral argument in
McDonald v. Chicago,85 in which plaintiff’s attorney Alan Gura was
arguing for the incorporation of the Second Amendment against the
states via the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and immunities
clause, rather than the standard approach of incorporation via the due
process clause, there was an interesting interchange between Gura
and Justice Antonin Scalia.86 After hearing Gura make his case for
incorporation via privileges and immunities, Scalia commented:
Well, I mean, what you argue is the darling of the
professoriate, for sure, but it's also contrary to 140
years of our jurisprudence. Why do you want to
undertake that burden instead of just arguing
substantive due process? Which, as much as I think
it's wrong, I have—even I have acquiesced in it.
(Laughter.).87

84.

As the Second Circuit noted in its Palin decision:
We conclude by recognizing that First Amendment protections are
essential to provide “breathing space” for freedom of expression.
But, at this stage, our concern is with how district courts evaluate
pleadings. Nothing in this opinion should therefore be construed to
cast doubt on the First Amendment’s crucial constitutional
protections. Indeed, this protection is precisely why Palin’s
evidentiary burden at trial—to show by clear and convincing
evidence that [NY Times editor] Bennet acted with actual malice—
is high. At the pleading stage, however, Palin’s only obstacle is the
plausibility standard of Twombly and Iqbal. She has cleared that
hurdle.
Palin v. N.Y. Times Co., 940 F.3d 804, 816–17 (2d Cir. 2018) (citations omitted).
85. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
86. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, McDonald, 561 U.S. at 742
(No. 08–1521), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/2009/08-1521.pdf.
87. Id. at 7.
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Even if one believes—as in fact Justice Thomas did with privileges
and immunities in McDonald, and as he seems to believe with regard
to Sullivan—that a drastic shift in precedent is justified by doctrine,
there is powerful pressure to make the changes as small, and as
consistent with existing doctrine, as possible. Though there may be
five justices who are willing to alter the Sullivan regime substantially,
the likelihood is that any alterations will be made in a less exciting
fashion than Justice Thomas desires. Nonetheless, as I hope I have
demonstrated, there are numerous less-drastic ways to make libel law
more sensible.
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